Carbon Taxes
A Special Tax on the Carbon Content of Fuels
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Victoria Transport Policy Institute
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Updated 27 February 2017
This chapter discusses carbon taxes, which are special taxes based on fuel carbon content intended to encourage energy conservation and climate change emission reductions.
Carbon taxes are taxes based on fossil fuel carbon content, and therefore a tax on carbon dioxide emissions. They differ from current North American fuel excise taxes, which are applied primarily to motor vehicle fuels as a way to finance highways and other transportation services. Because carbon taxes are intended primarily to internalize the environmental costs of fuel consumption and encourage energy conservation, there is no particular requirement for how their revenues should be used. Revenues can be used to reduce taxes, provide rebates, or finance new public services, including energy conservation programs. If most revenues are returned to residents and businesses, resulting in no significant increase to total government income, the taxes are considered revenue neutral, called a tax shift. Many economists advocate tax shifting to help achieve strategic policy objectives: raise taxes on bads, such as pollution emissions, and reduce taxes on goods, such as labor and investments (Clarke and Prentice 2009).
Carbon taxes are generally applied by state, provincial or federal jurisdictions at the point of production, distribution or sales.
The price Elasticity of gasoline is typically about -0.3 in the short run and -0.7 in the long run, meaning that a 10% price increase reduces fuel consumption 3% in a year or two, and 7% in five to ten years. Short-term fuel savings consist of reduced driving and a shift toward more fuel-efficient vehicles owned in multi-vehicle households. Over the long-term, higher fuel prices encourage consumers to purchase more fuel-efficient vehicles. About two-thirds of long-term fuel savings typically come from increased fuel efficiency and one third from reduced vehicle travel. As a result, increased fuel taxes cause greater fuel savings but less vehicle travel reductions then the same amount of revenue collected through per-mile fees, road tolls or parking charges.
Because carbon taxes are durable and predictable they tend to have higher elasticities than other fuel price changes. Rivers and Schaufele (2015) find that a five cent carbon tax causes an 8.4% gasoline demand reduction, about four times higher than the 2.1% reduction caused by an identical five cent increase in other market prices fluctuations.
The Elasticity of vehicle travel with respect to fuel price is typically found to be -0.20 to -0.30, with values of about –0.1 in the short run, and up to –0.50 over the very long run. Some U.S. studies of fuel price and consumption patterns during the 1990s, when real fuel prices declined and real incomes increased, found lower price responses (Hughes, Knittel and Sperling, 2006; Small and Van Dender, 2007), but more recent research indicates more normal elasticities (CERA, 2006; Williams Derry, 2008).
Table 1 Travel Impact Summary
|
Objective |
Rating |
Comments |
|
Reduces total traffic. |
2 |
Has a modest impact on vehicle travel. |
|
Reduces peak period traffic. |
1 |
Peak-period travel tends to be less price sensitive than off-peak travel. |
|
Shifts peak to off-peak periods. |
0 |
|
|
Shifts automobile travel to alternative modes. |
1 |
Provides a modest incentive to shift mode. |
|
Improves access, reduces the need for travel. |
|
|
|
Increased ridesharing. |
1 |
|
|
Increased public transit. |
1 |
|
|
Increased cycling. |
1 |
|
|
Increased walking. |
1 |
|
|
Increased Telework. |
1 |
|
|
Reduced freight traffic. |
1 |
|
Rating from 3 (very beneficial) to –3 (very harmful). A 0 indicates no impact or mixed impacts.
Carbon Taxes are an effective Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction strategy, help reduce vehicle travel, and provide revenue. Because travel reductions are relatively modest, congestion reduction and roadway cost savings also tend to be modest compared with the same revenue collected through other charges such as urban roadway or parking fees. Carbon taxes tend to provide greater total benefits than many other energy conservation and emission reduction strategies, since it provides traffic reduction benefits such as reduced congestion, road and parking costs, accidents and sprawl.
Fuel Tax increases, such as Carbon Taxes, tend to reduce traffic casualties. Grabowski and Morrisey (2004) estimate that each 10% fuel price increase reduces total automobile deaths by 2.3%, with about twice as large an impact on younger drivers, who tend to be more sensitive to fuel prices. Sivak (2008) found that a 2.7% decline in vehicle travel caused by fuel price increases and a weak economy during 2007-08 resulted in much larger 17.9% to 22.1% month-to-month declines in traffic deaths, probably due to disproportionate reductions in vehicle travel by lower income drivers (who tend to be young and old, and therefore higher than average risk) and speed reductions to save fuel.
Implementation costs are minimal, since most jurisdictions already collect fuel taxes. The petroleum industry argues that increased fuel taxes harm the economy, but this is probably not true, since the costs are primarily economic transfers within the economy: increased payments by motorists are offset by increased revenues or reductions in other taxes (TDM and Economic Development). Although steep, unexpected fuel price increases impose transition costs to the economy (i.e., producer and consumer choices based on low fuel prices are inefficient when fuel prices increase), and transfer of wealth from petroleum consuming regions to petroleum producing regions, a predictable increase in fuel taxes is not necessarily harmful to productivity in a region if revenues are retained within the economy (Shapiro, Pham and Malik, 2008). Raising current fuel taxes encourages consumers to develop energy efficient travel patterns, which reduces their exposure to economic risks from future fuel price increases.
Table 2 Benefit Summary
|
Objective |
Rating |
Comments |
|
Congestion Reduction |
1 |
Modest reductions in vehicle travel. |
|
Road & Parking Savings |
2 |
Modest reductions in vehicle size and travel. |
|
Consumer Savings |
-1 |
Increases vehicle operating costs. Overall impacts depend on how revenues are used. |
|
Transport Choice |
-1 |
Mixed. Driving becomes less affordable, but may increase support for alternative modes. |
|
Road Safety |
2 |
Mixed. Increased safety from reduced driving may be offset by use of smaller cars that offer less occupant protection. |
|
Environmental Protection |
3 |
Significant reduction in fuel use and related pollutants. |
|
Efficient Land Use |
2 |
Modest reductions in vehicle travel. |
|
Community Livability |
2 |
Modest reductions in vehicle travel and vehicle size. |
Rating from 3 (very beneficial) to –3 (very harmful). A 0 indicates no impact or mixed impacts.
Critics often claim that Carbon Taxes are unfair to people who must consume more than average fuel due to their job, location or lifestyle, such as truck drivers, residents or rural and northern communities, and recreational motor boaters. However, in virtually all cases these people can significantly increase their energy efficiency particularly over the long term, by insulating homes, choosing more fuel efficient vehicles, and reducing mileage. Critics claim that rural residents cannot save energy because they lack high public transit service, but they can achieve large fuel savings by choosing more efficient vehicles, ridesharing and consolidating trips.
Many critics claim that this tax will hurt low income households. They are wrong. Although fuel price increases may seem regressive (a dollar tax imposes a greater burden on poor than wealthy people), lower-income people purchase much less fuel than higher income people. Low-income households will benefit overall from a tax shift that returns revenues as per capita rebates, progressive tax reductions, or new services that benefit lower-income people. Described differently, although fuel taxes are regressive, representing a greater portion of household expenditures for lower-income than higher-income households, targeted tax reductions, cash rebates and improved services for poor people tend to be extremely progressive with respect to income, so revenue-neutral carbon taxes can be extremely progressive overall.
This tax is even more progressive if implemented with energy conservation policies and programs, such as improved walking and cycling conditions, increased ridesharing and public transit services, smart growth land use policies, and home insulating programs. Because such programs tend to experience economies of scale (for example, as rideshare demand grows the chance of finding a favorable rideshare match increases exponentially, and a public transit demand grows, unit costs of providing high quality service declines).
Table 3 Equity Summary
|
Impacts |
Rating |
Comments |
|
Treats everybody equally. |
-1 |
Some groups (i.e., rural residents) bear greater costs than others. |
|
Individuals bear the costs they impose. |
2 |
Increases the portion of vehicle costs recovered through user fees. |
|
Progressive with respect to income. |
-1 |
Fuel taxes are regressive, but overall impacts depend on how revenues are used. |
|
Benefits transportation disadvantaged. |
3 |
Can reduce roadway expenses borne by non-drivers, and encourages development of travel alternatives. |
|
Improves basic mobility. |
0 |
No significant impact. |
Rating from 3 (very beneficial) to –3 (very harmful). A 0 indicates no impact or mixed impacts.
Carbon Taxes can be justified in most geographic conditions, particularly those that import petroleum. Carbon tax increases are usually implemented by federal or state/provincial governments. Some regional or local governments have modest fuel tax options.
Table 4 Application Summary
|
Geographic |
Rating |
Organization |
Rating |
|
Large urban region. |
2 |
Federal government. |
3 |
|
High-density, urban. |
2 |
State/provincial government. |
3 |
|
Medium-density, urban/suburban. |
2 |
Regional government. |
1 |
|
Town. |
2 |
Municipal/local government. |
1 |
|
Low-density, rural. |
2 |
Business Associations/TMA. |
0 |
|
Commercial center. |
2 |
Individual business. |
0 |
|
Residential neighborhood. |
1 |
Developer. |
0 |
|
Resort/recreation area. |
1 |
Neighborhood association. |
0 |
|
|
|
Campus. |
0 |
Ratings range from 0 (not appropriate) to 3 (very appropriate).
Incentive to Reduce Driving.
By increasing the variable cost of driving, fuel tax increases support most other TDM strategies. Carbon Taxes are an Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction strategy. They are a Fuel Tax Increase and a Comprehensive Market Reform.
Carbon Taxes are implemented by Federal, State or Provincial governments. Some Regional or Local governments have optional fuel taxes, but these tend to be too small to have much impact on travel behavior. Motorist organizations, the petroleum industry, trucking organizations and transport-intensive industries tend to oppose such tax increases, while environmental organizations and government agencies (which require new revenue) often support them.
The primary barrier to Carbon Taxes tends to be political resistance from petroleum, vehicle and transportation industries, and motorists (Leiserowit, et al. 2011). Such tax reforms may depend on making them part of a package that satisfies a variety of objectives and constituencies.
Durning and Bauman (1998) and the Carbon Tax Center (www.carbontax.org) recommend the following:
The Canadian province of British Columbia was a first-mover in the field of carbon pricing in the transport sector in North America (Sodero 2009). British Columbia’s 2008 budget includes the first revenue neutral carbon tax in North America (Litman 2009). It starts 1 July 2008 at $10 per tonne of carbon in 2008, and increases $5 per tonne annually for at least four years. Table 5 illustrates tax rates for various fuels. Revenues are returned to individuals and businesses through various tax cuts and rebates, including a $100 per resident Climate Action Dividend distributed June 2008, and special rebates for low income households.
Table 5 British Columbia Carbon Tax Rates For Various Fuels
|
Fuel |
Unit |
2008 |
2009 |
2010 |
2011 |
2012 |
|
Carbon |
Tonne of Carbon |
$10 |
$15 |
$20 |
$25 |
$30 |
|
Regular Gasoline |
cents/liter |
2.33¢ |
3.50¢ |
4.66¢ |
5.83¢ |
6.99¢ |
|
Diesel |
cents/liter |
2.69¢ |
4.04¢ |
5.38¢ |
6.73¢ |
8.07¢ |
|
Jet fuel |
cents/liter |
2.61¢ |
3.92¢ |
5.22¢ |
6.53¢ |
7.83¢ |
|
Propane |
cents/liter |
1.54¢ |
2.31¢ |
3.08¢ |
3.85¢ |
4.62¢ |
|
Natural gas |
dollars/gigajoules |
$0.50 |
$0.74 |
$0.99 |
$1.24 |
$1.49 |
|
Coal – low heat |
dollars/tonne |
$17.77 |
$26.66 |
$35.54 |
$44.43 |
$53.31 |
|
Coal – high heat |
dollars/tonne |
$20.77 |
$31.16 |
$41.54 |
$51.93 |
$62.31 |
This table shows British Columbia’s carbon tax rates for various fuels.
The United Kingdom had a policy of increasing fuel taxes by 5% per year as an energy conservation and TDM strategy. Research by the European Environment Agency indicates that it has reduced emissions compared with what would have otherwise occurred (EEA, 2000). In November 2000 the government discontinued that policy in response to popular resistance due to wholesale fuel price increases, but has not reduced taxes.
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Fuel tax could cut emissions: U.S. should follow lead of German, Japanese policies Craig Morris, San Francisco Chronicle, December 17, 2006
Gov. Schwarzenegger could take a lesson from Germany if he's really serious about attaining his tough, new air-quality goals. In September, the governor signed into law the Global Warming Solutions Act, AB32, which stipulates that by 2020 the state will cut its emissions of greenhouse gases to 1990 levels, a 25 percent decrease from today's levels. Sounds good, but targets can be missed. The mechanisms to meet the targets are therefore crucial. Germany found that one way to do that was to impose an "ecotax." To improve fuel economy, Germany simply raised the price of gas with this surcharge.
Countries like France, the Netherlands and Germany already charged around $6 per gallon, but Germany raised the price by an additional 10 cents a year from 1999 to 2003. Germans now pay nearly $6.50 per gallon. The increase was not steep (less than 2 percent per year), but it sent a signal to the market that gas would not be getting any cheaper.
No one told carmakers what to build or German consumers what to buy, but the announcement of small, gradual price increases allowed people to plan in a way that sudden shocks -- like the 50 percent increase in U.S. gas prices after hurricanes Katrina and Rita -- do not. Germans had time to react to higher prices by deciding to switch to a more fuel-efficient car, driving less, carpooling, taking public transit, cycling or walking. And those who wanted the thrill of driving a sport utility vehicle on the autobahn could still do so if they had the cash.
By 2004, fuel consumption had dropped by around 7 percent from 1999 levels; 6 percent more Germans were riding public transport; and cars with nearly 80 miles per gallon fuel efficiency hit the market. Yes, 80 mpg. That's not a typo; it's a Volkswagen Lupo. And unlike the two- seater Smart, with 69 mpg, the Lupo (like Audi's classy A2 with 78 mpg) is a four-seater.
Now compare the success of Germany's ecotax to American fuel-efficiency standards. The American standards, designed to raise the average mileage of new cars, basically tell automakers how to build cars. But the standards didn't increase average miles per gallon dramatically in the late 1970s and early 1980s, skyrocketing gas prices after two oil crises did. Once gas prices fell and remained low, the standards had little effect. In fact, the average fuel economy of all vehicles on the road has not moved much since 1987. The 1927 Ford Model A would meet today's fuel-efficiency standards.
Is anyone here watching Europe's success? Yes, Al Gore has been calling for a carbon tax for months. He wants to use the revenue to offset payroll taxes -- exactly what Germany has been doing since 1999. But when MSNBC reported on Gore's idea, it called it a "novel approach" -- no mention of Germany's success.
Of course, many Americans are calling for higher fuel-efficiency standards -- but that's the bad news. These standards are by their very design doomed to failure because efficiency can ironically undercut itself by making consumption cheaper. Think about it: if you could suddenly drive 100 miles longer on one tank of gas, would you drive less or more? When efficiency lowers consumption, demand for energy drops, lowering prices, which in turn undercuts investments in efficiency -- a catch-22 without price mechanisms.
Too bad Americans don't understand that higher prices are the solution.
Targets don't work if they are unrealistic. In 1990, California told automakers and consumers that it wanted 10 percent of the vehicles sold in the state by 2003 to be zero-emission, but the cars didn't sell in great enough numbers, and the project failed. Battery-powered cars leave much to be desired, and fuel-cell cars are still not ready for the market.
The Japanese have a more clever system of targets based on what industry demonstrates to be possible: the average efficiency is determined for a type of car, say four-door sedans, and the least-efficient products must be improved every year. That won't bring sudden, dramatic improvement, but over a few years, it would make a significant difference. Oh, did I mention that gas prices in Japan are nearly twice as high as in the United States?
Unfortunately, we don't look at Japan and Europe enough. Otherwise, we would have seen Japanese hybrids coming while we were still focused on zero-emission cars.
The press release for California's Global Warming Solutions Act calls it a "first-in-the-world comprehensive program." It also later states that the mechanisms to reach the target must be specified by Jan. 1, 2009. So California has set a target without mechanisms. I say: Forget about targets, stop acting like we are the world leaders, and start copying the mechanisms of those who are. America, it's time to play catch-up, not catch-22.
Craig Morris is the author of Energy Switch: Proven Solutions for a Renewable Future. |
A Rand Corporation study (Toman, Griffin, Lempert, 2008) concludes that a tax on fossil fuels is a better way to achieve carbon emission reductions than a subsidy on renewable fuels since such a tax encourages conservation (such as more fuel efficient vehicles and more accessible land use patterns), while also raising revenues which could be returned to the consumers to help offset higher fuel costs, while renewable energy subsidies shield consumers from real prices, giving them little incentive to conserve, and require increased government expenditures.
A Congressional Budget Office study (CBO, 2005) concluded that uncertainty about the cost of controlling carbon dioxide emissions makes price instruments preferable to quantity instruments, such as emission caps, because they are more likely to minimize the adverse consequences (excess costs or forgone benefits) of choosing the wrong level of control. Pricing motivates people to control emissions up to the point where the cost of doing so was equal to the emission price. If actual costs were less than, or greater than, anticipated, people would limit emissions more than, or less than, policymakers projected. The advantages of a price-based approach stem mainly from the fact that the cost of limiting a ton of emissions is expected to rise as the limit becomes more stringent, while the expected benefit of each ton of carbon reduced is roughly constant across the range of potential emission limitations in a given year. That constancy occurs because climate effects are driven by the total amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, and emissions in any given year are a small portion of that total. Further, reductions in any given year probably would fall considerably short of total baseline emissions for that year.
www.planetark.org/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/18219/story.htm
WELLINGTON, October 18, 2002 - New Zealand announced plans yesterday for a carbon tax that will push up fuel costs but help the country meet targets under the Kyoto climate change agreement. The tax of up to NZ$25 (US$12) a tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent will be levied sometime after 2007, and only if the controversial Kyoto protocol comes into force internationally. It would raise retail petrol prices by up to six percent, diesel by 12 percent, and gas and electricity prices by eight to nine percent, government papers showed. Big losers would be coal users, whose costs would jump 19%. "The policies...will enable New Zealand to meets its greenhouse gas emission targets under the Kyoto protocol while protecting the nation's economic interests," Energy Minister Pete Hodgson said, after the tax proposal was approved by the cabinet. An as-yet-unknown amount of cash raised by the new tax would be offset by cuts to other taxes, he said. New Zealand produces between 70 million to 90 million tonnes of carbon dioxide a year, ranking it the fourth largest per capita producer after the United States, Australia, and Canada.
In cover stories focusing on world dependence on Middle Eastern oil, The Economist (December 15, 2001, pp. 9 and 16) cites environmental tax reform as a route to greater energy security. Its Leaders editorial argues that U.S. gasoline tax is too low. According to the column, a long-term plan to shift taxes from incomes to carbon emissions is needed. This would spur development of new transport technologies that are vital in curbing the demand for oil. In its story “A Dangerous Addiction,” the magazine says the best way to promote the development of alternative fuels and new technologies is through taxation that reflects the energy security risk (as well as dangers to health and the environment) of burning oil. Europe recognizes this, and over the past decade has started to shift the burden of taxation from income to, for example, carbon emissions.
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It would be folly to ignore that we live in a motor age. The motor car reflects our standard of living and gauges the speed of our present-day life. It long ago ran down Simple Living, and never halted to inquire about the prostrate figure which fell as its victim. With full recognition motor-car transportation we must turn it to the most practical use. It can not supersede the railway lines, no matter how generously we afford it highways out of the Public Treasury. If freight traffic by motor were charged with its proper and proportionate share of highway construction, we should find much of it wasteful and more costly than like service by rail. Yet we have paralleled the railways, a most natural line of construction, and thereby taken away from the agency of expected service much of its profitable traffic, which the taxpayers have been providing the highways, whose cost of maintenance is not vet realized.
The Federal Government has a right to inquire into the wisdom of this policy, because the National Treasury is contributing largely to this highway construction. Costly highways ought to be made to serve as feeders rather than competitors of the railroads, and the motor truck should become a coordinate factor in our great distributing system…. -- Warren G. Harding, State of the Union, 1922 (http://tinyurl.com/dzofl) |
BC (2008), B.C.’s Revenue-neutral Carbon Tax: Backgrounder, British Columbia Ministry of Finance (www.bcbudget.gov.bc.ca); at www.bcbudget.gov.bc.ca/2008/backgrounders/backgrounder_carbon_tax.htm.
Carbon Tax Center (www.carbontax.org) provides information on carbon tax issues.
CBPP (2007), Climate-Change Policies Can Treat Poor Families Fairly and Be Fiscally Responsible, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (www.cbpp.org/pubs/climate-brochure.htm).
CTC (2008), What is a Carbon Tax? Carbon Tax Center (www.carbontax.org)
CBO (2003), Fuel Economy Standards Versus a Gasoline Tax, Congressional Budget Office (www.cbo.gov); at ftp://ftp.cbo.gov/49xx/doc4917/12-24-03_CAFE.pdf; summary report at ftp://ftp.cbo.gov/51xx/doc5159/03-09-CAFEbrief.pdf.
CBO (2005), Limiting Carbon Dioxide Emissions: Prices Versus Caps, Congressional Budget Office (www.cbo.gov); at www.cbo.gov/ftpdoc.cfm?index=6148&type=0.
CBO (2008), Effects of Gasoline Prices on Driving Behavior and Vehicle Markets, Congressional Budget Office (www.cbo.gov); at www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/88xx/doc8893/01-14-GasolinePrices.pdf.
CCAP (2005), Transportation Emissions Guidebook: Land Use, Transit & Transportation Demand Management, Center of Clean Air Policy (www.ccap.org/guidebook).
Center for a Sustainable Economy (www.rprogress.org/programs/sustainableeconomics) provides resources concerning tax shifting and environmental tax reform, including proposals to change fuel and vehicle prices.
CERA (2006), Gasoline and the American People, Cambridge Energy Research Associates (www2.cera.com/gasoline).
Harry Clarke and David Prentice (2009), A Conceptual Framework for the Reform of Taxes Related to Roads and Transport, School of Economics and Finance, La Trobe University, for the 'Australia's Future Tax System' review by the Australia Treasury; at http://apo.org.au/research/conceptual-framework-reform-taxes-related-roads-and-transport.
Eric de Place (2008), Tax-and-Dividend, Sightline Institute (www.sightline.org); at http://daily.sightline.org/daily_score/archive/2008/06/18/tax-and-dividend.
Eric de Place (2008), BC’s Carbon Tax Shift, Sightline Institute (www.sightline.org); at www.sightline.org/daily_score/archive/2008/02/19/bc-s-carbon-tax-shift.
DfT (2009), Transport Analysis Guidance: 3.3.5: The Greenhouse Gases Sub-Objective, Department for Transport (www.dft.gov.uk); at www.dft.gov.uk/webtag/documents/expert/unit3.3.5.php.
Alan Durning and Yoram Bauman (1998), Tax Shift, Sightline Institurte (www.sightline.org); at www.sightline.org/publications/books/tax-shift/tax.
Alan Durning (2008), More on BC’s Carbon Tax (http://daily.sightline.org/daily_score/archive/2008/03/10/more-on-bc2019s-carbon-tax-shift) and Other Tax Shifts (http://daily.sightline.org/daily_score/archive/2008/03/10/other-carbon-tax-shifts).
David C. Grabowski and Michael A. Morrisey (2004), “Gasoline Prices and Motor Vehicle Fatalities,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management (www.appam.org/publications/jpam/about.asp), Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 575–593. For more recent analysis see “As Gas Prices Go Up, Auto Deaths Drop,” Associated Press, 11 July 2008; at http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080711/ap_on_he_me/auto_deaths_gas_prices; and “10 Things You Can Like About $4 Gas,” Time Magazine, July 2008; www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1819594_1819592_1819582,00.htm.
Greenhouse Gas Equivalencies Calculator (www.epa.gov/energy/greenhouse-gas-equivalencies-calculator) is a USEPA website that compares various units and examples of climate change emissions and emission reduction impacts.
Jonathan E. Hughes, Christopher R. Knittel and Daniel Sperling (2006), Evidence of a Shift in the Short-Run Price Elasticity of Gasoline Demand, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 12530 (http://papers.nber.org/papers/W12530).
Yusuke Inoue (2011), Likelihood of Global Carbon Pricing: International Pilot Study on Carbon Tax, Social Cost Of Carbon And Revenue Use, Dissertation for MSc in Environmental Economics and Environmental, University of York.
Jesse D. Jenkins and Valerie J. Karplus (2016), Carbon Pricing Under Binding Political Constraints, Working Paper 2016/44, World Institute for Development Economic Research (www.wider.unu.edu); at www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/wp2016-044.pdf.
Anthony Leiserowitz, Edward Maibach, Connie Roser-Renouf, and Nocholas Smith (2011), Climate Change In The American Mind: Public Support For Climate & Energy Policies In May 2011, Yale Project on Climate Change Communication, Yale University and George Mason University (www.environment.yale.edu); at http://environment.yale.edu/climate/files/PolicySupportMay2011.pdf.
Gar W. Lipow (2008), Price-Elasticity of Energy Demand: A Bibliography, Carbon Tax Center (www.carbontax.org); at www.carbontax.org/wp-content/uploads/2007/10/elasticity_biblio_lipow.doc.
Todd Litman (2005), “Efficient Vehicles Versus Efficient Transportation: Comparing Transportation Energy Conservation Strategies,” Transport Policy, Vol. 12, No. 2, March 2005, pp. 121-129; at www.vtpi.org/cafe.pdf.
Todd Litman (2007), Smart Emission Reduction Strategies, VTPI (www.vtpi.org); at www.vtpi.org/ster.pdf.
Todd Litman (2007), Appropriate Response To Rising Fuel Prices, VTPI (www.vtpi.org); at www.vtpi.org/fuelprice.pdf.
Todd Litman (2008), Improving BC’s Carbon Tax: Changes and Enhancements To Increase
Effectiveness and Equity, Victoria Transport Policy Institute (www.vtpi.org); at www.vtpi.org/carbontax_improvement.pdf.
Todd Litman (2009), “Evaluating Carbon Taxes As An Energy Conservation And Emission Reduction Strategy,” Transportation Research Record 2139, Transportation Research Board (www.trb.org), pp. 125-132; based on Carbon Taxes: Tax What You Burn, Not What You Earn, Victoria Transport Policy Institute (www.vtpi.org); at www.vtpi.org/carbontax.pdf.
Todd Litman (2010), Changing Vehicle Travel Price Sensitivities: The Rebounding Rebound Effect, VTPI (www.vtpi.org); at www.vtpi.org/VMT_Elasticities.pdf.
Gerhard Metschies (various years), International Fuel Prices, German Agency for Technical Cooperation (www.internationalfuelprices.com).
OECD (2007), The Political Economy of Environmentally Related Taxes, policy brief and book, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (www.oecd.org); at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/26/39/38046899.pdf and www.oecd.org/env/taxes/politicaleconomy.
OECD (2013) Effective Carbon Prices, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (www.oecd.org); at www.oecd.org/env/tools-evaluation/carbon-prices.htm.
The Pigou Club (www.pigouclub.com) is an organization of economists who support special taxes to internalize currently externalized costs, particularly petroleum and carbon taxes. The NoPigou Club (http://nopigouclub.blogspot.com) is an organization of economists who oppose special taxes to internalize currently externalized costs, particularly petroleum and carbon taxes.
Jonathan L. Ramseur and Larry Parker (2009), Carbon Tax and Greenhouse Gas Control: Options and Considerations for Congress, U.S. Congressional Research Service; at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40242_20090223.pdf.
Nicholas Rivers and Brandon Schaufele (2015), “Salience of Carbon Taxes in the Gasoline Market,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 74, pp. 23–36 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2015.07.002); earlier version at www.ivey.uwo.ca/cmsmedia/1361416/salience-of-carbon-taxes.pdf.
Robert Shapiro, Nam Pham and Arun Malik (2008), Addressing Climate Change Without Impairing the U.S. Economy: The Economics and Environmental Science of Combining a Carbon-Based Tax and Tax Relief, The U.S. Climate Task Force (www.climatetaskforce.org); at www.climatetaskforce.org/pdf/CTF_CarbonTax_Earth_Spgs.pdf.
Michael Sivak (2008), Is The U.S. On The Path To The Lowest Motor Vehicle Fatalities In Decades?, Report UMTRI-2008-39, University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute (www.umtri.umich.edu); at http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/60424/1/100969.pdf.
Kenneth A. Small and Kurt Van Dender (2007), “Fuel Efficiency and Motor Vehicle Travel: The Declining Rebound Effect,” Energy Journal, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 25-51; at www.econ.uci.edu/docs/2005-06/Small-03.pdf.
Stephanie Sodero (2009), Policy In Motion: Reassembling Carbon Pricing Policy Development In The Personal Transport Sector In British Columbia, Dissertation, Oxford University (http://bccarbontax.blogspot.com).
Thomas Sterner (2006), “Fuel Taxes: An Important Instrument for Climate Policy,” Energy Policy, Vol. 35. pp. 3194–3202; at www.efdinitiative.org/sites/default/files/fuel20taxes20an20important20instrument20for20climate20policy20-20sterner.pdf.
Michael Toman, James Griffin, Robert J. Lempert (2008), Impacts on U.S. Energy Expenditures and Greenhouse-Gas Emissions of Increasing Renewable-Energy Use, Environment, Energy and Economic Development Program, Rand Corporation (www.rand.org); at www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2008/RAND_TR384-1.pdf.
USEPA Transportation Tools (www.epa.gov/climatechange/wycd/tools_transportation.html) provides links to sources of information on transportation activities, emissions and emission reduction strategies.
Clark Williams Derry (2008), Braking News: Gas Consumption Goes Into Reverse, Sightline Institute (www.sightline.org); at www.sightline.org/publications/reports/braking-news-gas-consumption-goes-into-reverse.
This Encyclopedia is produced by the Victoria Transport Policy Institute to help improve understanding of Transportation Demand Management. It is an ongoing project. Please send us your comments and suggestions for improvement.
Victoria Transport Policy Institute
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